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EXPLOITATION OF CARE LABOR 
INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, I argue that critical race feminism provides a lens 
for dismantling the current system ofU.S.laws that regulate labor 
and reproduction, a set of laws that are often represented as unre-
lated race- and gender-neutral public policies in legal decisions and 
in dominant media. Critical race feminism challenges this framing of 
the relation between public policy, power, and identity through the 
mechanism of counter-narrative. Following other feminist theorists 
that conceptualize the law as archive, I show how contemporary 
feminists have developed an anti-archive of counter-narrative that 
generates alternative models for linking bodily integrity and social 
welfare. To demonstrate the usefulness of this anti-archive to legal 
studies, I examine the dominant discourse found in two case studies 
to show how feminist counter-narratives challenge this discourse: the 
Supreme Court case Buck v. Bell (1927) and current attempts by vic-
tims of forced sterilization to claim reparations in Virginia and North 
Carolina;1 and Harris v. Quinn (2014), a case in which the Supreme 
Court decided that care attendants in the home, supported by 
Medicaid funds, could not be compelled to pay union dues. 2 Feminist 
counter-narratives allow for links between the cases, demonstrating 
that these public policies take form as part of institutional oppres-
sion that targets low-income women, especially women of color. 3 
* Ann Kennedy is a Professor of Women's and Gender Studies and First-Year 
Writing at University of Maine-Farmington. She is the author of Historicizing Post-
Discourses: Postfeminism and Postracialism in United States Culture (SUNY Press 20 17) 
The author would like to the thank the editors of the Journal for their careful prep-
aration of the Article for publication and to dedicate the Article to reproductive justice 
activists everywhere. 
1. Buck v. Bell, 247 U.S. 200 (1927); see Sarah Brightman et al., State-Directed 
Sterilizations in North Carolina: Victim-Centered ness and Reparations, 55 BRITISH J. 
CRIMINOWGY 474, 474--93 (2015); see generally KEviN BEGOS ET AL., AGAINST THEIR 
WILL: NORTH CAROLINA'S STERILIZATION PRoGRAM (Gray Oak Books, 2012). 
2. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014). 
3. See Brightman et al., supra note 1, at 477. 
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In the 1980s, a scholar activist movement of students and 
faculty of color developed a set of methods and frameworks in legal 
studies known as critical race theory (CRT), an "articulation of 
racial power, one that eschewed the reigning frames that worked to 
reduce racism to matters of individual prejudice or a by-product of 
class."4 Recognizing the failure of liberal reform to "address the 
institutional, structural and ideological reproduction of racial hierar-
chy,"5 critical race theory "questions the very foundations of the 
liberal order, including equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlighten-
ment rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law ."6 
Critical race theory has been instrumental in demonstrating how 
"neutraf' institutions of the state reproduce racial hierarchy-in 
ideologies of color blindness, in adherence to individualism, and in 
the production and reproduction of identity as hierarchy through a 
narrow assimilationist logics-and contesting these institutions. 7 
In 1989 and 1991, Kimberle Crenshaw, a founding CRT theorist 
and a co-founder and Executive Director of the Mrican American 
Policy Forum, published two articles introducing intersectionality 
as a conceptual method for reframing antidiscrimination law, femi-
nist theory and activism, and Black studies and the Civil Rights 
Movement to address Black women's structural, political, and 
representational oppression. 8 She demonstrated that in every site 
ofinstitutional and social power, the experiences and voices ofBlack 
women are marginalized by the dominant frame that uses single-
axis conceptions of identity to understand constructions of social 
reality. 9 Crenshaw argues that Black women's discrimination claims 
cannot be addressed within preexisting legal constructs: "problems 
of exclusion cannot be solved simply by including Black women 
within an already established analytical structure."10 Thus, her 
work extends CRT's critique of assimilationist reform as a means of 
creating substantive transformation of state and social institutions 
4. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking 
Back to Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV., 1253, 1260 (2011). 
5. Id. at 1262. 
6. RICHARDDELGADO&JEANSTEFANCIC,CRITICALR.ACETHEORY:ANINTRODUCTION 
3 (3d ed. NYU Press 2011). 
7. See Crenshaw, supra note 4, at 1253-54. 
8. See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and 
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and 
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F., 139, 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, 
Demarginalizing the Intersection]; Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Vwlence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 
1241, 1242-44 (1991). 
9 . See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection, supra note 8, at 139. 
10. See id. at 140. 
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and instead focuses on the reconceptualization of dominant para-
digms used to regulate and represent identity. 11 Cho, Crenshaw, and 
McCall argue that 
what makes an analysis intersectional ... is its adoption of an 
intersectional way of thinking about the problem of sameness and 
difference and its relation to power. This framing-conceiving of 
categories not as distinct but as always permeated by other 
categories, fluid and changing, always in the process of creating 
and being created by dynamics of power--emphasizes what in-
tersectionality does rather than what intersectionality is .... In-
tersectionality is inextricably linked to an analysis of power ... . 
The recasting of intersectionality as a theory primarily fascinated 
with the infinite combinations and implications of overlapping 
identities from an analytic initially concerned with structures of 
power and exclusion is curious given the explicit references to 
structures that appear in much of the early work. 12 
In her early theorizations ofintersectionality, Crenshaw also focuses 
on its roots in Black feminist social activism stretching back to the 
abolitionist and women's rights struggles of the nineteenth century, 
demonstrating that intersectionality is a Black feminist way of know-
ing developed in Black feminist social movements and in coalitional 
work with others such as Black men, other women of color, and white 
feminists. 13 Crenshaw's work itself can be categorized as part of"an 
evolving tradition" of women of color legal scholarship that Adrien 
Katherine Wing identified as "Critical Race Feminism."14 Several 
key components of Crenshaw's theorizations and, more broadly, of 
critical race feminist work are often omitted when put into social 
movement and institutional practice or when appropriated across 
different fields of research. 15 However, it is not my purpose here to 
examine either the critiques ofintersectionality and critical race femi-
nism, or the use and misuses of intersectionality across disciplines 
and in contemporary feminist scholarship and activism. 16 Instead, 
in Part I, I introduce the methods in critical race feminism that allow 
11. See id. at 159. 
12. Sumi Cho et al., Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, 
and Praxis, 38 SIGNS 785, 797 (2013). 
13. See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection, supra note 8, at 140, 152. 
14. CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER 2 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., NYU Press 
1997) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM]. 
15. See Cho et al., supra note 12, at 788-89. 
16. See id. at 787--88. Recent discussions of those debates include a special issue of 
Signs 38 (2013). See also ANNA CARASTATIITS, lNTERSECTIONALITY: ORIGINS, CONTESTA· 
TIONS, HORIZONS, 125 (Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2016); VIVIAN M. MAY, PuRsillNG INTER-
SECTIONAIJTY, UNSETTLING DOMINANT IMAGINARIES 2 (2015). 
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feminist theorists to challenge prima facie neutral laws of gender 
and race and demonstrate that they form a network of laws and 
public policies targeting low-income, predominantly women of color. 
I. REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE AND THE ANTI-ARCHIVE 
In Movement Intersectionality, critical race theorists Dorothy 
Roberts and Sujatha Jesudason argue that 
intersectionalityforces us to break through these [identity] cate-
gories to examine how they are related to each other and how 
they make certain identities invisible. This shift from seeing our 
differences to seeing our relatedness requires that we under-
stand identity categories in terms of matrices of power that are 
connected rather than solely as features of individuals that 
separate us . . .. [T]he radical potential for intersectionality lies 
in moving beyond its recognition of difference to build political 
coalitions based on the recognition of connections among sys-
tems of oppression as well as on a shared vision of social justice. 
The process of grappling with differences, discovering and creating 
commonalities, and revealing interactive mechanisms of oppres-
sion itself provides a model for alternative social relationships.17 
One social movement that develops almost simultaneously and from 
the same set of methodological frameworks as critical race feminism 
is the reproductive justice movement. As Roberts and Jesudason 
argue, "[r]eproductive justice is a prime example of applying an in-
tersectional framework to both political theorizing and political 
action."18 The reproductive justice framework developed from the 
activism of women of color in the 1990s, although its roots are in 
earlier women of color and socialist feminisms in the 1970s, such as 
the Committee to End Sterilization Abuse, the National Welfare 
Rights Organization, Women of All Red Nations (WARN), and 
Chicana activists who helped fight the sterilization of predomi-
nantly Chicana women in California in the case of Madrigal v. 
Quillen, the Indian Health Services record of coerced sterilizations, 
and eventually change the sterilization consent standards at HEW.19 
17. Dorothy Roberts & Sujatha Jesudason, Movement Intersectionality: the Case of 
Race, Gender, Disability, and Genetic Technologies, 10 Du BOIS REV., 313, 316 (2013) 
(citation omitted). 
18. ld. 
19. See UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 
10 (Jael Silliman et al. eds., South End Press 2d ed. 20 16); NANCY ORDOVER, AMERICAN 
EUGENICS: RACE, QUEER, ANATOMY AND THE SCIENCE OF NATIONALISM, 183 (U. Minn. 
Press 2003); Maya Manian, The Story of Madrigal v. Quilligan: Coerced Sterilization of 
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Their experiences with public hospitals and doctors; social workers; 
welfare offices; the Indian Health Service; the Department ofHealth, 
Education, and Welfare; and the passage of the Hyde Amendment 
became the basis for contemporary critiques of Roe v. Wade's "right 
to privacy" footing as an adequate framework for the securing of 
reproductive rights for women of color. 
Loretta Ross and Rickie Solinger, in Reproductive Justice: An 
Introduction, open the book by defining the movement's principles, 
reproductive justice goes beyond the pro-choice/pro-life debate 
and has three primary principles: (1) the right not to have a child; 
(2) the right to have a child; and (3) the right to parent children 
in safe and healthy environments. In addition, reproductive 
justice demands sexual autonomy and gender freedom for every 
human being.20 
The authors argue that achieving the goals of reproductive justice 
requires "access to specific, community-based resources including 
high-quality health care, housing and education, a living wage, a 
healthy environment, and a safety net for times when these re-
sources fail."21 
One of the methods utilized to organize the reproductive justice 
movement is storytelling. Adrien Katherine Wing states that one of 
the "comerstone[s]" of CRT is that "a culture constructs its own social 
reality in its own self-interest. CRT's critique of society thus often 
takes the form of storytelling and narrative analysis-to construct 
alternative social realities and protest against acquiescence to unfair 
arrangements designed for the benefits of others."22 Confronted with 
political, legal, and cultural systems that framed contemporary iden-
tity politics within the discourse ofpostracialism, critical race femi-
nists also tackled the discourse ofpostfeminism, articulating the ways 
in which gender-equality laws conceptualized through a single-axis 
frame have worked for many individual, predominantly white women, 
but have not, in fact, to quote Audre Lorde, "dismantle[d] the master's 
house."23 Thus, counter-narratives are not merely stories, but stories 
that challenge the hegemonic logic that structures public policy and 
Mexican-American Women, U.S.F.L. 1, 7 (forthcoming 2019); Meg Devlin O'Sullivan, 
Informing Red Power and Transforming the Second Wave: Native American Women and 
the Struggle Against Coerced Sterilization in the 1970s, 25 WOMEN'S HIST. REv., 965, 975 
(20 16), for a discussion of the activism of women of color against forced sterilization. 
20. LoRETTAJ. ROSS & RICKIE SOIJNGER, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION, 
9 (Univ. Cal. Press 2017) (emphasis omitted). 
21. Id. 
22. CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 14, at 3. 
23. AUDRALoRDE, SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 112 (Crossing Press 2007). 
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legal decision-making; counter-narratives challenge existing struc-
tures that reproduce inequality through the categorical frame of 
racist patriarchy, by making that frame visible and by providing 
transformative strategies to change normative institutions. 
The counter-narratives of critical race feminism are power 
analytics and cannot be separated from the explicit desire to trans-
form the legal system-in part by working to center those voices 
that have been objectified in the formal and informal hierarchical 
processes of that system, but also in gesturing toward new configu-
rations of political movements and new ways of constructing law 
and public policy. While many literary theorists and some critical 
race scholars associate counter-narrative with empathy and persua-
sion, I read counter-narrative within the frame of 1970s feminist 
consciousness-raising, the purpose of which is not primarily directed 
toward goals of empathy or specificlegal claims.24 Counter-narrative 
has much in common with the practice of consciousness-raising.25 
Consciousness-raising is a primary form of collective identity forma-
tion toward decision-making and collective action.26 As Ross and 
Solinger describe it, consciousness-raising is a crucial process in 
movement building: 
Vulnerable people may recognize the dangers of telling their 
truths individually, no matter how much they are dying inside. 
So we often work together for strength and safety. In the 1970s, 
the women's movement, for example, used storytelling in groups----
what was called "consciousness-raising'' then-to interrupt cycles 
of gendered silencing and oppression. . . . Storytelling helped 
create the national coalition SisterSong Women of Color Repro-
ductive Justice Collective in 1997. SisterSong, the leading propo-
nent of the concept reproductive justice in the United States and 
abroad, adopted the motto: "Doing collectively what we cannot 
do individually'' to reflect its members' conviction that our collec-
tive power is based on and derived from our power to tell our 
own stories. 27 
Using the techniques of counter-narrative, a storytelling approach 
to the legal system that makes claims based on the experiential 
totality of social structures, rather than narrow legal claims based 
on adversarial positions means reframing conflicts as products of an 
24. See DELGADO & STEFANIC, supra note 6, at 3, 33-35, and 48-49, for a summary 
of this debate in CRT. 
25. See Ross & SOLINGER, supra note 20, at 60. 
26. ld. 
27. I d. at 60 (footnote omitted). 
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ideological system or as Lisa Ikemoto puts it, entails looking "beyond 
the law, to the way that social reality constructs the [legal] conflict."28 
Thus, counter-narratives are not in opposition to a dominant "side" 
as in a "conflict of interests," or in the "balancing of interests" that 
proceeds in the system oflaw, but demonstrate how the legal system 
structures social reality in its elision of its own assumptions of 
authority, as the ideological structure that frames the procedures of 
the legal system. If the interpretative power of the law is structur-
ally located with institutions that have their roots in racist patriar-
chy, if those institutions continue to draw on that history and to use 
the same texts and methods to interpret that history, then it must 
be met with tactics, narratives, and interpretations that challenge 
the premises of those institutional practices. 
Much of this intersectional feminist work is being done in art, 
literature, and collective performance practice, particularly in the 
building of feminist coalitions around critical race feminism, repro-
ductive justice, and disability rights. In the sections that follow, I 
discuss some of this work and its engagement with the legal and 
medical archives of eugenics. My purpose is to show how the counter-
narratives of this feminist work open up the eugenic archive in ways 
that work across differences and hierarchies, seeking commonalities 
and struggling to find alternative means of addressing the harms of 
gender and race oppression in the United States. I argue that this ap-
proach has been missing from the justice efforts for victims of eugenic 
sterilization in the United States. Finally, I demonstrate how these 
works help feminists reconceptualize the relation between reproduc-
tive justice and economic justice. As Scott Barclay, Lynn C. Jones, 
and Anna-Maria Marshall argue, "[s]ocial movement success arises 
not from changing the law per se, but rather in changing the ability 
of formerly marginalized groups to now exercise additional power in 
the changing dynamic it negotiates through and with the law."29 
Obviously at stake in the reparations programs in states like 
North Carolina and Virginia for sterilization victims are the ar-
chives that would have remained buried but for the work of Johanna 
Schoen, an historian of reproductive rights, gaining access to the 
records and sharing them with journalists at the Winston Salem 
Journal.00 This type ofhistorical archival work and the significance 
28. CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 14, at 138; Lisa lkemoto, Furthering the 
Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women, 
59 TENN. L. REV. 487, 487--88 (1992). 
29. Scott Barclay, Lynn C. Jones & Anna-MariaMarshall, Two Spinning Wheels: Study-
ing Law and Social Movements, 54 STUDIES IN L. POL., & Soc'Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 3 (20 11). 
30. See Scott Sexton, Are Victims of Eugenic Sterilization Program Any Closer to a 
Fulfillment of Promises, WINSTON-SALEMJ. (June 29, 20 14), https://www .journalnow.com 
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it has for public policy and the law today, however, has been a promi-
nent discussion across the disciplines in the last few decades, evi-
denced by recent literary and artistic engagements with the archive 
that I discuss in this section. 31 Vivian May argues that it is an inter-
sectional framework, in part, that has produced this engagement with 
the archives, explaining that 
[i]ntersectional reinterpretations (or interruptions) of history ... 
are a means of situating oneself, or one's group, within histories of 
resistance. Acknowledging this wider trajectory effects an im-
portant "rupture" in collective and individual consciousness: it 
opens up possibilities, past and present, by denaturalizing oppres-
sion and presenting it as an ongoing process, not an accomplished 
(and implicitly unchangeable) fact .... [I]n asking whose voices 
have been heard, documented, or recognized, intersectionality not 
only raises questions about who "counts" as a knower, but also 
what counts as evidence of resistance or insurgency: in so doing, 
it entails a redefinition of the past, a rethinking of the archive. 32 
In contemporary theoretical work on archives, archives are no longer 
seen as mere repositories of records, evidence of past events, but the 
"traces" of those events that link past and future, according to our 
own uses of them. 33 As Jacques Derrida argues, "there is no political 
power without control of the archive, if not of memory. Effective 
democratization can always be measured by this essential criterion: 
the participation in and the access to the archive, its constitution, 
and its interpretation."34 To struggle with legal and medical archives 
as forms of power, particularly as they have the ability to reproduce 
ideological systems of race and gender hierarchy, then, requires 
unconventional methods to "excavate" the human subjects dehu-
manized in their records. 35 Chandan Reddy argues that, 
[l]ike all archives, the law ... as an archive is not simply an 
institutional site for the recording of the past and of historical and 
social difference. Rather, it is a framework that, ironically, prom-
ises its reader agency only through the perpetual subjugation of 
/news/columnists/scott_sextonlare-victims-of-eugenic-sterilization-program-any-closer-to 
-a/article_7 aa32894-0ab8-56bb-ac33-de703be3f271.html [https://perma.cciMA 75-GTTZ]; 
see also Kevin Begos, Read This: Records Unexpectedly Available, in AGAINST THEIR 
WILL: NORTH CAROLINA'S STERILIZATION PRoGRAM 33 (Gray Oak Books 20 12). 
31. See Sexton, supra note 30. 
32. MAY, supra note 16, at 56 (citation omitted). 
33. See id. at 189. 
34. JACQUES DERRIDA, ARCHIVE FEvER: A FREUDIAN IMPRESSION 11 (Eric Prenowitz, 
Univ. of Chi. Press, 1996). 
35. MAY, supra note 16, at 58. 
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differences, a subjugation, then, that targets not only the past 
but also the future. Indeed the law as an archive addressed to 
the citizen or potential subject of"civility" seeks, above all, to be 
an archive ofthe future. 36 
139 
The feminist anti-archive, then, not only challenges the social archi-
tecture of the past, but demonstrates how the archive limits our 
understanding of the past to that 
[e]mpty homogeneous time [that] is the utopian time of capital. 
It linearly connects past, present, and future, creating the possi-
bility for all of those historicist imaginings of identity, nation-
hood, progress, and so on that [Benedict] Anderson, along with 
many others have made familiar to us. But empty homogenous 
time is not located anywhere in real space-it is utopian. The 
real space of modern life consists of heterotopia .... Time here 
is heterogeneous, unevenly dense. 37 
One example of this kind of archival engagement as collective 
resistance is the "Anarcha Project," a performance collective on the 
stories of Anarcha, Betsey, and Lucy, the three enslaved black women 
who were subjected to serial surgeries at the hands ofMarion Simms, 
memorialized as the father of gynecology. 38 One of its organizers, 
Petra Kuppers, writes in Remembering Anarcha.· Objection in the 
Medical Archive, that 11[t]he archives of medicine give me little help 
in accessing the being-in-the-world experienced by someone other 
than myself .... The distance the archive enacts, the 'objective' 
abstraction necessary to the generation of data, keeps me away."39 
Kuppers argues that the systemic domination that produces some 
human subjects for experimentation is part of the architecture of the 
archival record. 40 In the case of Anarcha, Betsey, and Lucy, the anti-
archive seeks some form of representation that Kuppers calls a 
"sticky web" that makes us more "sensitive to the level of interpreta-
tion" and 11claim[s] that surround[] historical embodiment" without 
further objectifying victims.'11 The creative act of decolonizing the 
archive means bringing heterogeneity to concepts of historical time, 
36. Chandan Reddy, Diaspora, Asylum and Family, in INTERSECTIONALITY: A FOUNDA-
TIONS AND FRoNTIERS READER 29 (Patrick R. Grzanka, ed., Westview Press, 2014). 
37. P ARTHA CHATrERJEE, THE POLITICS OF THE GoVERNED: REFLECTIONS ON POPULAR 
POLITICS IN MOST OF THE WORLD, 6-7 (Colum. U. Press 2004). 
38. Petra Kuppers, Anarcha Project Essay, LIMINALITIES: J. PERFORMANCE STUD. 4.2 
(2008). 
39. Id. 
40. I d. at 2-3. 
41. ld. at6. 
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so that feminist anti-archives depend on a creative weaving of new 
connections between past and present that are neither there, wait-
ing to be found, nor linear in their address to the future. In this 
way, the creative projects discussed here create that "sticky web" 
between past and present formations of reproductive oppression to 
imagine futures of reproductive justice, showing how dependent 
those reparative claims are on epistemic witnessing. 
Over the course of the last two decades, Carrie Buck has emerged 
as an important historical figure because she was chosen as a con-
stitutional test case for eugenicist Harry Laughlin's model steriliza-
tion law;42 new scholarly attention to the history of eugenics has 
focused on the 1927 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Buck v. Bell 
that legalized the sterilization of citizens who had been institution-
alized by the state.43 However, no trace of Carrie Buck's own self-
making exists to distinguish her from the numerous others steril-
ized under the more than thirty U.S. state laws passed in the early 
twentieth century.44 Buck was a young white woman living with a 
foster family, the Dodds, who was raped by one of the family members; 
when they discovered her pregnancy the Dodds had her admitted to 
the Virginia asylum where her mother was already institutionalized 
and where Carrie gave birth to a daughter, Vivian.46 Medical histori-
ans have spent many years "proving'' that Carrie's diagnosis as 
''feebleminded" in 1924 was a fabrication, relying on the very re-
cords used to sanction her sterilization. 46 
The medical-legal and welfare archives leave a rich accounting 
of her case-the details of her mental, emotional, and physical 
status-but Carrie is subjugated through the archive at the same 
time that it claims to give her historical presence.47 Her name is 
archived over and over as part of the process of objectification: her 
condition, her medical status, her social status in social worker files, 
42. ORDOVER, supra note 19, at 135-36. 
43. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,207-08 (1927). 
44. ORDOVER, supra note 19, at 134. 
45. ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES: THE SUPREME COURT, AMERICAN EUGENICS, AND THE 
STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK 28-29 (Penguin Books 2017). 
46. See PAUL LoMBARDO, CENTURY OF EUGENICS: FROM THE INDIANA EXPERIMENT TO 
THE HUMAN GENOME ERA. (Bloomington: Ind. Univ. Press 2010) (containing most of the 
details of Carrie's case and the history of eugenics); see also PAUL LoMBARDO, THREE 
GENERATIONS No IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL (John 
Hopkins Univ. Press 2008) [hereinafter LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS]; COHEN, supra 
note 45. I first remember reading about Carrie Buck's case in SUSAN LURIE, UNSETTLED 
SUBJECTS: RESTORING FEMINIST POLITICS TO POSTSTRUCTURALIST CRITIQUE (Duke Univ. 
Press 1997) and DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, 
AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (Vintage Books 1997). 
4 7. See sources cited, supra note 46. 
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asylum files, eugenics records, letters between doctors and eugenicists 
and lawyers, court files, and transcripts. 48 These institutional docu-
ments construct the epistemology in which Carrie is named and 
renamed, in the medical records as "feebleminded"; by Justice Holmes 
as an "imbecile"; in the words of Albert Priddy, the superintendent 
of the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded, where 
Carrie was an inmate; Carrie is of the type of "the shiftless, igno-
rant, and worthless class of antisocial whites of the South."49 
These are definitions of Carrie, not descriptions of any condition 
that she may have had. She embodies a condition that afflicts society, 
a difference that threatens ("worthless" "shiftless" and "anti-social") 
its well-being. 5° In Carrie's case, we can see, as Reddy argues, that 
the archive is a site for the regulation of difference as hierarchy. 51 
According to Reddy, understanding the limited epistemology of the 
archives requires asking: 
how regulation marks its interest in difference .... requires read-
ing these figures [of the archive] against the grain of the archive, 
situating that archive within and against the social formation-
the forces and relations that constitute it .... to read the figure 
as the limit of the archive, the point at which the archive's own 
conditions for existence might be retraced. 62 
In the twenty-first century, Carrie became a figure of interest 
to historians of the eugenic project, but also to feminists, particu-
larly those invested in reproductive justice-perhaps because she 
figures not at all in the feminist archives of the 1920s. 53 Feminist 
approaches to the archive ask not about the evidence that supports 
Carrie's diagnosis and substantiates her sterilization, but question 
those "forces and relations" that constitute the archive, "those con-
ditions for existence" that create Carrie as a limit figure of"threat'' to 
the well-being of society and, thus, the figure that holds together the 
epistemology of the "universal," "the normal," the not-shiftless, the 
not-ignorant-the not-worthless, the not-antisocial class of whites. 54 
48. See LoMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 46, at 1fr-35; see also COHEN, 
supra note 45. 
49. COHEN, supra note 45, at 2, 194; LoMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 46, 
at 134. 
50. LoMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 46, at 134. 
51. See Reddy, supra note 36, at 29. 
52. ld. 
53. See MAROUF HAsiAN, JR., THE RHETORIC OF EUGENICS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN 
THOUGHT 72-73, 86-88 (Univ. of Georgia Press 20 17), for a discussion of American femi-
nist interpretations and selective appropriation of eugenics. 
54. COHEN, supra note 45, at 2, 194; LoMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 46, 
at 134. 
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This process is complex, however, since it must also account for the 
erasure of Carrie's subjectivity from the archive without ignoring 
her objectification as a historical presence that gives meaning to the 
nature of personhood and citizenship.65 This retracing also means 
retracing the regulatory ideals of liberal, white feminism as one of 
the conditions that make this archive possible. 56 
Thus, the projects discussed here all recover Carrie's story as a 
feminist story, as part of a process of reimagining intersectional 
feminist approaches to the body, delinking feminism from the enter-
prises of contemporary neoeugenics that oppress poor and/or women 
of color under the sign of"universality."57 These projects align them-
selves with Carrie and with an alternative history of feminism that 
lends itself to a transformative politics of reproductive justice. Creat-
ing a web of meanings that suggest new ways of thinking about how 
the reparative claims of victims are recognized by the state and in 
public policy as well as theorizing the frames through which repro-
ductive justice should be debated. 
The history of feminist arguments for reproductive justice 
cannot be understood without a recovery of the premises that violate 
the bodily integrity and autonomy of Carrie Buck as well as the 
premises that defined her as unfit for reproduction and parenting. 58 
As Alexandra Minna Stern argues, "when the reproductive and 
erotic body is highlighted, an uninterrupted line can be drawn from 
the sterilization laws passed by state legislatures in the 1910s that 
targeted 'morons' and the 'feebleminded' to the sexual surgeries per-
formed by federal agencies on poor female welfare recipients during 
the 1960s."59 This "uninterrupted line" appropriates the premises of 
the archive for the future rather than challenge those premises. 60 
The feminist anti-archive disrupts that line and redirects our atten-
tion to other frameworks of understanding. 
Queer, disabled artist Eli Clare titles their piece ''Yearning 
Toward Carrie Buck."61 This "yearning'' toward Carrie as an omission 
in the feminist archives speaks a desire for feminist reparations that 
55. See Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, NAT. HIST. MAG., July 1984, at 
5-6. 
56. Cf. Alexandra Minna Stern, STERIUZED In The Name of Public Health: Race, 
Immigration, and Reproductive Control in Modern California, 95 AM. J. PuBLIC HEALTH 
1128, 1134 (2005). 
57. HAsiAN, supra note 53, at 87. 
58. See id. at 73-74. 
59. ALExANDRA MINNA STERN, EUGENIC NATION: FAULTS AND FRONTIERS OF BETTER 
BREEDING IN MODERN AMERICA 7 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2015). 
60. Seeid. 
61. Eli Clare, Yearning Toward Carrie Buck, 8 J . LIT. & CULTURAL DISABILITY STUD. 
335-344 (2014). 
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go beyond the meager apologies some governors have made to the 
victims of eugenic sterilization in their states. 62 Clare seeks the voice 
and the feelings that the archive has repressed, but they also seek 
to recognize Carrie's silence as part of the archive's necessary condi-
tions.63 Clare imagines a future solidarity that does not erase femi-
nism's absence/presence in the eugenic archive. In place of Carrie's 
voice, Clare imagines Carrie's body as the archive's suppressed text, 
its domination a condition of the archival record: "I can almost see 
the word imbecile etched on your belly, each letter a thin line of scar. 
Trapped, hounded, desperate-you were released only after John 
Bell cut into you on October 19, 1927. The body as gut and bowel, hope 
and dread, literal trash."64 Carrie's body is not only trash, disposable, 
but a blank space made legible only through the linked archives of 
surgical and legal documentation, a record of her own debasement 
which is "instrumentalized in the service of the regulation of differ-
ence."65 Carrie is not citizen, but a placeholder of a population: "Have 
the historians forgotten? There'd be no story without Carrie's body. 
The body as gristle and synapse, water and bone, pure empty space, 
the body as legal precedent."66 But Carrie's body is mathematical as 
well-quantitative and generative; pseudo-statistics estimate her 
normality, three generations the limits of the court's recognition of 
her rights, zero the number of times feminists expressed solidarity 
with Carrie in 1927. 
Clare addresses Carrie through identification with the ableist 
narration of Carrie's story by historians and feminists.67 Clare tells 
Carrie, "recent historians seem to think the court case and your 
sterilization might have been less a travesty if you had been intellec-
tually disabled. They want to believe in real imbeciles. I, diagnosed 
mentally retarded in 1966, imagine, yearn, stretch toward you, 
judged feebleminded in 1924."68 Clare's investigation of the archives, 
like the investigation of historians, shows that Carrie's labeling has 
less to do with mental ability and is instead a fabrication of the 
patriarchy: raped and blamed and revictimized, the archive connects 
62. See William Branigin, Va. Apologizes to the Vr.ctims of Sterilization, WASH. POST 
(May 3, 2002), https://www .washingtonpost.com/archive/loca.l/2002/05/03/va -apologizes 
-to-the-victims-of-sterilizations/9cbfe2ad-950c-4 7f8-a186-c68e4dle362e/?noredirect 
=on&utmterm=.e6140388d823 [https://perma.cc!HA6W-78YA]; see also Clare, supra note 
61, at 335, 342. 
63. See Clare, supra note 61, at 337. 
64. ld. at 338. 
65. Reddy, supra note 36, at 29. 
66. Clare, supra note 61, at 336. 
67. See id. at 341--42. 
68. ld. at 342. 
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sexuality and gender identity to mental and moral capacities, refus-
ing women autonomy and bodily integrity.69 But why, asks Clare, is 
it important to proclaim Emma, Carrie, and Vivian as not-imbeciles?70 
What would have been justified if they were found to have intellec-
tual disabilities? In thinking about the limit embodied in Carrie for 
the feminist archive, Clare asks: when we strike down the facts of 
the archives, in our zeal do we leave intact its premises?71 
Similar questions haunt Rory Dawn, the child narrator ofTupelo 
Hassman's novel Girlchild. 72 Rory Dawn wants to understand Carrie 
Buck's experience as non-mother in the social worker archive, 
stripped of her right to mother Vivian. 73 The novel begins with Rory 
telling readers about her own mother's missing teeth; the gap was 
always there to remind her mother of who she was, keeping her from 
ever feeling comfortable laughing: "[i]t's the same with being feeble-
minded. No matter how smart you might appear to be later with 
your set of diplomas on their fine white parchment, the mistakes 
you made before the real lessons sunk in never fade."74 Rory steals 
the social worker file on her mother and resists its degraded label-
ing of her mother, and when a man in their trailer park begins 
sexually abusing her, she befriends a possibly imaginary girl named 
Vivian Buck. 75 When Vivian disappears, Rory rediscovers her in the 
pages of a library book and decides to write a report on Carrie Buck's 
case: "Mama was right. I did find her again, and after spending all 
this time alone, finding my best friend right there on page 237 feels 
like an exclamation point in my heart."76 Rory begins to see herself as 
a "feeble-minded daughter of a feeble-minded daughter'' in the out-
lines of Viv's story: "[t]he thinking on [Justice] Holmes's part was 
that if members of the white race behaved in undesirable ways, these 
behaviors would creep into the upper classes like weeds, root down 
deep, and put the choke on the delicate hybrids growing up around 
them."77 Hassman emphasizes the racialized class dimensions of 
Carrie's story, demonstrating the threat to the white supremacist 
state that poor white women's unregulated sexuality represents. 78 
69. See id. at 33f)....42. 
70. Id. at 341. 
71. See id. (discussing these questions about disability rights, sexuality, and class); see 
also Michelle Oberman, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Buck v. Bell: Thoughts Occasioned 
by Paul Lombardo's Three Generations, No Imbeciles, 59 J. LEGAL Enuc. 357, 388 (2010). 
72. TuPEW HAsSMAN, GIRLCHILD 182 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2012). 
73. ld. at 182. 
74. ld. at 3--4. 
75. See generally id. 
76. Id. at 171. 
77. ld. at 174. 
78. HAsSMAN, supra note 72, at 172--73. 
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At the end of the novel, after her mother is killed drunkenly 
trying to cross a street with no crosswalk and no signal, Rory Dawn 
commits her story to the anti-archive by burning down their trailer 
and taking off for parts unknown: "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's 
flag flies in triumph for Roe and Brown but it still hangs at half-
mast in the case of Buck v. [sic] and I can't let that stand. I may not 
have been born captain of this boat, but I was born to rock it."79 Rory 
refuses state care because in writing her C-essay about Buck v. Bell, 
she comes to understand the denial of personhood is committed 
against Vivian as well as Carrie: 
Viv and I share this history. These are our mothers and the 
beliefs that touch us and the words that judge us and like the 
entries in the encyclopedia, there's no keeping just the good parts 
and separating the rest. Mothers and grandmothers might align 
Viv and me but the Man does the rest. We're like shoes tied tight 
together and thrown over electrical wire; every pulse going 
through that wire goes right through us.80 
Rory Dawn replaces the social worker's estimate of her mother and 
in so doing reminds us that Carrie was a mother, that Vivian was 
taken away from her as a newborn and delivered back to the same 
foster family in which Carrie was raped, fulfilling the closed circular 
logic of eugenic ideology.81 
Both authors approach Buck not only from the perspective of 
reproductive autonomy as an adult woman facing state violence, but 
that of a girl child stigmatized by a system that tracks her into chan-
nels of adult failure.82 The meaning of Buck for contemporary repro-
ductive justice is also a record of institutional violence against the 
female body, as rape is institutionalized as the girl child's deviance.83 
This institutionalization of violence is enacted in the archive that rec-
ords domination as poor women's sexual and reproductive deviance--
the family, the school, the state institution, and the courts deny Carrie 
her parental rights in incorporating her daughter back into the 
same family that victimized her. 84 The archive records no resistance 
on the part of social workers to Carrie's institutionalization, her 
sterilization, or the denial of her parental rights.85 
79. ld. at 176. 
80. Id. at 182--83 (emphasis added). 
81. Seeid. 
82. See gen-erally id. 
83. See Jess Whatcott, Sexual Deviance and 'Mental Defectiveness" in Eugenics Era 
California, NOTCHES (Mar.14, 2017), http:l/notchesblog.com/2017/03/14/sexual-deviance 
-and-mental-defectiveness-in-eugenics-era-california [https://perma.cc/G237-RYEM]. 
84. See Gould, supra note 55 (emphasis added). 
85. ld. 
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This focus on the social worker file demonstrates a link between 
the "unfit" and the feminized role of the social worker in protecting 
the interests of the state.86 In 2014, NYU's Asian/PacifirJAmerican 
Institute produced a series of performances as part of its exhibit 
titled ''Haunted Files: the Eugenics Record Office," an immersive rec-
reation of the Long Island eugenics archives. 87 In one piece ''Unheard 
Voices," a creative resignification of the archives occurs through the 
juxtaposition of the records88 of the social worker and Smith alum 
Margaret Andrews, and the voice of her "unfit" biracial "client" Hazel 
Whiteman, reversing the powerful function of the state and placing 
the power of perspective in the audience's ears.89 Like Carrie, Hazel 
is taken in by a foster family that puts her to work and is raped by 
her foster father, ending up pregnant and "immoral."90 The social 
worker tells the audience that she has been ''bred to be caring'' and 
is genetically predisposed to "compassion," but she has Hazel's baby 
taken away at birth, stating, "too heavy to lift" but "too useful to 
throw away."91 
This web of interpretation connects Carrie and Hazel demon-
strating the state's linking of "unfitness" to its investment in ex-
ploiting poor girls' labor. 92 The categorization of Carrie and Hazel's 
placement as "care" is shown to be a systemic investment in provid-
ing the domestic labor of poor girls to middle-class families.93 In fact, 
what makes Carrie's case different from previous cases brought 
before the courts is that her sterilization was placed within the 
framework of deinstitutionalization---once sterilized the "feeble-
minded" could be paroled and trained to do menial work; like Hazel, 
Carrie was expected and did return to the domestic work that she 
had been doing before her institutionalization.94 Dr. Priddy argued 
at Carrie's hearing that she "could be released and earn a living as 
a housekeeper. Because the 'demand for domestics in housework is 
so great,' probably 'half of our young women of average intelligence' 
86. Id. 
87. Haunted Files: The Eugenics Record Office, Unheard Voices: Haunted Files 
Special Performance, YOUTUBE (Sept. 22, 2015), https:/lwww.youtube.com/watch?v=TOw 
lapAQjS8 [https://perma.cc/G38R-VBZ9] [hereinafter Haunted Files]. 
88. See generally Petra Kuppers, Identity Politics of Mobility: Kara Walker and Berni 
Searle, 5.1 PERFORMANCE PARADIGM (May 2009). 
89. Haunted Files, supra note 87. 
90. ld. 
91. ld. 
92. ld. 
93. Compare LoMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 46, at 132, with Haunted 
Files, supra note 87. 
94. LoMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 46, at 132. 
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could be placed in jobs, but that practice was discontinued because 
of the 'constant chance of them becoming mothers,' he said."95 
Hazel's record is found in an archive separate from Carrie's.96 
The same year that Virginia passed its model sterilization law it 
passed its law prohibiting interracial marriage.97 In 1925, a Virginia 
eugenicist ranted, "[n]ot a few white women are giving birth to mu-
latto children. These women are usually feebleminded, but in some 
cases they are simply depraved. The segregation or sterilization of 
feebleminded females is the only solution to the problem."98 Clare, 
in their work, approaches the archives again, searching for the 
records of forced sterilization for Virginia's residents of color from 
the 1920s, writing, "I need to ask: in what ways did Carrie's white-
ness protect her?"99 As Rory Dawn recognizes, Carrie's body is an 
instrument of normative whiteness, a case put forth specifically from 
the white asylum to reduce the number of interracial children born 
to white women.100 Clare presses against the limits of the archives' 
segregationist orderings to ask about its omissions (what is not in 
these records of the white asylum, showing us how archives lie). If 
Carrie emerges as a historical test case, thousands disappear into 
the geography of institutional hierarchy and racist oppression. 
Carrie embodies segregationist obsessions with racial purity and 
her records become its expression of the concern with establishing 
white normativity through control of poor white women's sexuality. 
The reclaiming of Carrie is the claiming of kin, not through genetic 
records of the archive, but in the recognition of the archives catego-
rization, its obsession with the scientific recording of race, of mental 
ability, moral capacities, as a compulsion of classification in the 
service of legitimating the structure of its own making-and in the 
process, creating difference as hierarchy, as value. 
In a piece that resembles Clare's ''yearning'' toward Carrie, Cara 
Page performs "A Poet Psalm for the Mismeasured," for those who 
became the ''brick and mortar'' for scientific genocide, declaring "we 
reclaim you these discarded bodies" and "we release you from your 
95. Id. 
96. See generally Haunted Files, supra note 87. 
97. Lutz Kaelber, Virginia, EUGENICS: COMPULSORY STERILIZATION IN 50 AMERICAN 
STATES, https:/lwww. uvm.edul-lkaelber/eugenics/V AN Ahtml [https://perma.cc/WKT4 
-82WX]. 
98. Clare, supra note 61, at 340. 
99. ld. at 339. 
100. See Genevieve Carlton, Virginia Ran a Secret Eugenics Program That Didn't End 
Until1979, MEDIUM (Apr. 18 2018), https://medium.oom/@ed.itors91459/virginia-ran-a 
-secret-eugenics-program-that-didnt-end-until-1979-e9fubfd23c64 [https://perma.cc/3PCM 
-HZWN]. 
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cages and outrage."101 Page and Clare build an anti-archive by raising 
the dead from its files, in a fashion that somewhat eerily resembles 
Rory Dawn's surrection of an invisible friend, Vivian, to help her 
survive the abuse she suffers. Clare brings her address to Carrie to 
a close by addressing herself to contemporary feminists, stating: 
[b ]eyond the histories, I imagine a congress of sterilized women 
and men-raging, fierce, grief filled. Puerto Rican women sit with 
Appalachian men. First Nations teenagers sit with self-described 
mad women. Disabled folks who have lived their entire lives locked 
away in state-run hospitals sit with southern Black women who 
know all too well the words Mississippi appendectomy, the mean-
ing behind them. Women of color ordered by judges or paid to 
take Norplant sit with women tricked into signing tubal ligation 
consent forms. They won't be asking for apologies nor giving 
absolution, but rather holding remembrance, demanding repara-
tion, planning revolution. 102 
Clare's ending points us toward a future that imagines reproductive 
justice out of the revolutionary demands of communities in coalition, 
that recognizes sterilization as a collective harm to communities as 
well as a violation of bodily integrity and personhood of those already 
made vulnerable by a racist patriarchal state.103 This vision recognizes 
difference and signifies coalition in the struggle for reparations. 
This vision is very different from what has occurred and is oc-
curring in states such as North Carolina and Virginia which have gone 
through legislative processes to provide compensation for victims. 104 
First of all, in North Carolina, the term "reparation" was purposely 
dismissed as opening a door to discussions of reparations for slav-
ery, signaling the state legislature's and the Governor's task force's 
desires to limit the scope of historical and political discussion. 105 The 
framework brought to bear on these processes is neither victim-
centered nor informed by principles of reproductive justice as out-
lined by Ross and Solinger. 106 In other words, as Ordover argues, the 
101. Haunted Files: the Eugenics Record Office, Cara Page: A Poet Psalm for the Mis-
measured, YOUTUBE (Sept. 22, 2015), https:/fwww.youtube.com/watch?v=o2Z1dCPCLsk 
[https:/lperma.cc/V J5L-Y8CH]. 
102. Clare, supra note 61, at 343. 
103. Seeid. 
104. See Final Report to the Governor of the State of North Carolina, GoVERNOR'S TASK 
FORCE TO DETERMINE THE METHOD OF COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF N.C.'S EUGENICS 
BOARD (Jan. 27, 2012), https://files.nc.gov/ncdoa/JSV/FinalReport-GovernorsEugenics 
CompensationTaskForce.pdf [hereinafter Final Report]. 
105. Brightman et al., supra note 1, at 4 7 4-93. 
106. Id.; see also Final Report, supra note 104 (containing the minutes of each meeting, 
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processes of apology and compensation are for an event that hap-
pened in the past, "mistakes'' that must be recognized, so that we 
can learn and they never happen again, despite the evidence that 
such injustices continue and that eugenic logics clearly emerge as 
the logic behind other U.S. public policies of reproductive and eco-
nomic rights. 107 
One of the reasons that North Carolina and Virginia have made 
so few "compensation[s]" to victims is because of states' require-
ments that victims produce documentation of their sterilization 
without consent by the state-and that it be by the state and not a 
county health department. 108 Claims of reparative justice cannot be 
made using the documents of local archives although North 
Carolina has asked for documentation of those who suffered coerced 
sterilization. 109 That archive will document the state's denial of 
reparations based on the lack of archival documentation. 110 
Furthermore, the victim testimony recorded in the public hear-
ings of the North Carolina Governor's task force often shares the same 
language as the archive. 111 Again and again, victims discuss their 
fitness for parenthood or their sterilized parent's work ethic, parenting 
skills, or intelligence.112 The one meeting in which the victims were 
allowed to tell their stories without interruption is a record of the 
state's devaluation of the lives of its most vulnerable citizens, but it 
is also a hearing very much geared to have victims repeat state-
ments of societal "worthiness" that sometimes condemn the indiffer-
ence and cruelty of the state, but often work not counter to the 
premises of eugenics but within its binary framing of fit/unfit. 113 
My purpose is not to criticize the victims' stories, but to suggest 
that little effort has been made to engage in collective consciousness 
including comments from victims who support a more thorough public ongoing dis-
cussion of how eugenic sterilization was linked to white supremacy, poverty, and repro-
ductive rights). 
107. See ORDOVER, supra note 19, at 201. 
108. See Final Report, supra note 104, at B-5, B-6. There is evidence that many people 
were sterilized under the stamp of "eugenics" by county and town officials and doctors, 
but Virginia and North Carolina do not see the state as responsible for compensation. 
Id. Also, the state has not involved any of the corporations or organizations that funded 
eugenic sterilization in the process; victims themselves noted that these organizations 
should be a part of the reparative process and provide monetary compensation. I d. 
109. Eric Mennel, Payments Start for N.C. Eugenics Victims, but Many Won't Qualify, 
NPR (Oct. 31,2014, 5:04PM), https:/lwww.npr.org/sectionslhealth-shots/2014/10/31/36 
0355784/payments-start-for-n-c-eugenics-victims-but-many-wont-q ualify [https://perma 
.cc/K2YB-ZVK5]. 
110. Id. 
111. See Final Report, supra note 104, at D-7. 
112. Seeid. 
113. Seeid. 
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raising with the communities harmed by these practices, which might 
have allowed for more victims to come forward.114 Overwhelmingly, 
what emerges in these stories is the stigma associated with eugenic 
sterilization, and the state's lack of concern to have victims, their 
families, and communities participate in a more transformative col-
lective restorative justice project. 115 The state has designed the pro-
cess so that the North Carolina Governor's task force represents the 
victims when reproductive justice activists might have been engaged 
to work with the communities and groups most affected by repro-
ductive oppression-which would have also been those communities 
most oppressed by the state as well. 116 
Moreover, Nancy Ordover argues that eugenic practices in care 
for those with physical and cognitive disabilities, and how disability 
is socially defined, have been mostly absent from discussion: 
[f]rom the passage of the earliest sterilization statutes, warnings 
have been issued on the repercussions of eugenicists' assaults on 
the "feeble-minded." Eugenics opponents noted that women and 
people of color were frequently and erroneously so designated, 
and cautioned that endorsements of compulsory sterilization of 
the disabled would lead to an ever-widening circle of candidates 
among other reviled groups. Ironically, while physically and devel-
opmentally disabled women have historically been among the 
most prone to eugenic attack, their precarious position has rarely 
been viewed as anything other than an alarm, a call to safeguard 
the rights of [the] nondisabled, though otherwise marginalized, 
individuals and groups. 117 
Similarly, Johanna Schoen, whose turning over of the eugenic files 
to journalists eventually resulted in this compensation process, 
argues that intersectional reproductive justice frameworks have 
been mostly ignored.118 Schoen believes this is because the dominant 
114. Elaine Riddick is one of the survivors of eugenic sterilization who articulates a 
reproductive justice framework in her claims against the state. Associated Press, Woman 
Fights for Compensation for Forced Sterilization, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Aug. 5, 2011, 9:27 
AM), http://www.jackaonville.com/article/20110815/NEWS/801246149 [https:/lperma.cc 
/5DPK-TCUU]. She originally sued the North Carolina Eugenics Board as part of the 
Women's Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) class-action suit 
in 197 4 and lost. ld. See generally SHATEMA 'I'HREADCRAFI', INTIMATE JUSTICE: THE BLACK 
FEMALE BODY AND THE BODY POLITIC (Oxford Univ. Press 2016). 
115. See Final Report, supra note 104. 
116. See N.C. Exec. Order No. 83 (July 1, 2012), http:lldigital.ncdcr.gov/cdm/ref/collec 
tionlp 16062coll5/id/12148 [https://perma.cci8CJ9-GJT2]. 
117. ORDOVER, supra note 19, at 195 (footnote omitted). 
118. See generally JOHANNA SCHOEN, CHOICE AND COERCION: BIRTH CONTROL, STERIL-
IZATION, AND ABORTION IN PuBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 24 7 (Univ. N.C. 2005). 
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paradigm of women's sexuality and motherhood is embedded in 
eugenic logics: 
Women's reproductive rights ... and particularly the reproduc-
tive rights of welfare recipients, remain a contested issue. In 
fact, I would suggest that the public discussion ... centered on 
race at the expense of reproductive rights because a great many 
people in this country continue to believe that women should not 
have children while they are receiving public assistance. 119 
An intersectional approach would not separate discussions of race 
and reproductive justice, particularly in discussions of welfare rights 
and motherhood because, historically, racist stereotypes of black 
women have been used to defund programs such as Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and Medicaid.120 These racist 
stereotypes are at the root of support for such programs as workfare, 
child caps, and time-limits in the receipt ofTANF benefits, passed 
as part of the bipartisan Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu-
nity Reconciliation Act of 1996.121 
Theses compensation processes offer no transformative thinking 
about the relation between the archives and contemporary struc-
tures of oppression that might be used to put in place the economic 
structures, public policies (including the healthcare system), and 
social safety structures that reproductive justice requires.122 Nor 
does the process seek to place eugenic sterilization within a repro-
ductive justice framework that would connect it to contemporary 
issue such as the criminalization of pregnancy, discrimination against 
pregnant women, and currently, the separation and detention of 
minors from their refugee parents and the ability to lie to women 
seeking abortions, which are all reproductive justice issues. 123 
The "single-issue" platform of abortion negates the ways that 
eugenic logics, patriarchal dominance, and white supremacy continue 
to define processes of public policy making and how little mainstream 
liberal attention is given to issues that do not fit within the white 
liberal feminist definition of a reproductive rights issues (i.e., birth 
control, abortion). 124 Loretta Ross and Rickie Solinger provide one 
example of how such limited thinking results in an essentializing of 
119. ld. 
120. See JAEL SILLIMAN ET AL., UNDMDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR 
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 9, 162 (South End Press 2d ed. 2016). 
121. ld. at 162. 
122. Seeid. 
123. I d. at 9 . 
124. See id. at 5. 
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gender and is detrimental to the bodily autonomy and integrity of 
women of color.125 In 2011, in Mississippi, pro-choice activists fi-
nanced a successful campaign to defeat a "personhood" initiative on 
the ballot, but did not give equal funding and education to linking 
this issue to an initiative to further restrict voting rights in the state, 
and the initiative passed: 
African American women working in Mississippi and throughout 
the South were profoundly disappointed that some mainstream 
feminists failed to understand the intersection between women's 
rights and voting rights. This failure demonstrated how single-
issue feminism could be used to perpetuate white supremacy 
and thwart human rights, even in the twenty-first century.126 
Equally important, in ignoring how eugenic sterilization of 
Black women is part of ongoing attempts to control and regulate 
their sexual and bodily integrity and ability to mother, these pro-
cesses ignore the origins of eugenic logics in the enslavement of 
Black people and the genocide of indigenous peoples: 
[S]lave women's wombs to sustain the system of slavery provided 
an early model of reproductive control. "Eugenic ideas were per-
fectly suited to the ideological needs of the young monopoly capi-
talists," Angela Davis points out, as their "[i]mperialist incursions 
in Latin America and in the Pacific needed to be justified, as did 
the intensified exploitation of Black workers in the South and 
immigrant workers in the North and West." It is no wonder that 
the movement was financed by the nation's wealthiest capitalists, 
including the Carnegie, Harriman, and Kellogg dynasties .... 
[a]lthough eugenic policies were directed primarily at whites, 
they grew out of racist ideology.127 
II. CHRONIC HARM: REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE AND THE 
EXPLOITATION OF CARE LABOR 
In this final section, I consider another case that seems to be 
illuminated from an intersectional reproductive justice approach to 
125. See Ross & SOLINGER, supra note 20, at 117. 
126. See id. at 114 (citation omitted); see also Tanya Ann Kennedy, Feminist Ideology 
and the U.S. Supreme Court: A New Era? Speech at the National Women's Studies Ass'n 
Annual Convention (Nov. 2014) (offering another argument that links reproductive 
justice and Harris u. Quinn to the voting rights act. After 2016, intersectional feminist 
education on voting suppression and white supremacy as feminist issues has been occur-
ring more frequently). 
127. RoBERTS, supra note 46, at 61. 
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the archives, the Supreme Court case Harris v. Quinn.128 In that case, 
Pamela Harris, the caregiver for her disabled son, received a Medicaid 
subsidy from the state so that she could take care of him in her 
home.129 However, Harris objected to paying union dues to the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU), which represented health 
care workers in Illinois who were paid by the state to act as personal 
attendants in the home. 130 Although Harris was not required to join 
the union, she was required to pay union dues, according to the "fair 
share" law designed to prevent workers from accepting the benefits 
of the union's collective bargaining without contributing to its fi-
nancial support. 131 The Supreme Court decided that the state was 
only a "partial" employer and that the true employer was the client 
with a disability.132 The Court further concluded that caregivers 
supported by Medicaid funds could not be compelled to pay union 
dues because the client was the "true" employer.133 
As a jointly authored piece in The Nation pointed out, the 
majority opinion threatened state employee unionism but was also 
aligned with a racist patriarchal tradition of excluding care work 
from labor protections: 
[the majority opinion in] Harris is an extension of a different 
tradition in American labor law, the denial ofrights to workers 
in industries dominated by female and non-white workers. Far 
from universal, the major New Deal labor laws-the National 
Labor Relations Act, the Social Security Act and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act--explicitly excluded particular occupations, includ-
ing farm work and domestic labor, which had large numbers of 
128. See generally Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014). This ruling has now 
been effectively replaced by Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) in 
which the majority ruled that "[t]he state of Illinois' extraction of agency fees from 
nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment; Abood v. Detroit 
Bd. of Ed., which concluded otherwise, is overruled." Janus v. American Fed'n of State, Cty. 
&Mun. Emps., Council31, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/casesljanus 
-v-american-federation-state-county-municipal-employees-council-31 [https://perma.cc 
/QV7X-GNFM]. 
129. Sam Baker & Emma Roller, The Supreme Court Just Dealt a Devastating Blow 
to Public Unions, ATLANTIC (June 30, 20 14), https:l/www .theatlantic.comlpolitics/archive 
/20 14/06/the-supreme -court-just-dealt-a-devastating-blow-to-public-unions/44092 5 
[https:/lperma.cciSP59-CELU]. 
130. Supreme Court Asked to Hear Case Seeking Return of Union Fees, NAT'L RIGHT 
WoRK LEGAL FOUND. (May 21, 2018), https://nrtw.org/news/riffey-cert-05212018/ [https:/1 
perma.cc18QLL-GT8A]. Several caregivers joined this lawsuit with Harris as the lead 
petitioner, and thus, the "face" of the lawsuit. The National Right to Work Legal Defense 
Foundation funded the lawsuit. Id. 
131. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2014). 
132. See id. at 2638. 
133. See id. at 2634-38. 
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female, African-American and Mexican-American workers. While 
some racially and sexually biased exclusions were later elimi-
nated, Harris effectively extends this history of discrimination. 134 
In direct contrast to the undervaluation of this labor, Justice Kagan 
argued in her Hanis dissent that "[s]uch a ruling subverts the state's 
determination of these labors as being of the utmost public inter-
est."135 Kagan's emphasis on the connection between quality of care, 
and wages and benefits challenges the Court's attempt to devalue 
in-home-care work. 136 Because of collective bargaining, Kagan argues 
home-care assistants have nearly doubled their wages in less than 
10 years, obtained state-funded health insurance, and benefited 
from better training and workplace safety measures. . . . The 
State, in return ... believes it has gotten a more stable workforce 
providing higher quality care, thereby avoiding the costs associ-
ated with institutionalization [of home care clients]. 187 
The case of Harris raises significant questions about the orga-
nizing models of poor workers' unions. 138 The incorporation of home 
health care attendants into the SEIU was the result of a decades 
long struggle to organize workers who had previously been excluded 
from traditional unions and the most important national labor laws 
of the twentieth century.139 These early organizations developed out 
of worker centers and community organizations such as the Associa-
tion of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), as well 
as early domestic workers organizing at the local level. 140 Such 
organizing had to address what Nancy Fraser has identified as the 
"injustices of redistribution, recognition, and representation[.]"141 
134. Eileen Boris et al., After 'Harris v. Quinn': The State of Our Unions, THE NATION 
(July 2, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/after-harris-v-quinn-state-our-unions/ 
[https://perma.cc/33MM-KLBB]; see also Sarah Jaffe, Why Harris and Hobby Lobby Spell 
Disaster for Working Women, IN THESE TIMES (June 30, 2014, 5:41P.M.), http://inthese 
times.oom/working/entry/16894/sootus_rules_against_female_ workers [https://perma.cc 
/X8DF-TBZF] (pointing out that 90% of home healthcare workers [are] women and "most 
of them are poor, immigrants, and of color."). Additionally, in Harris, Alito has "cre-
ate [ d] [-and exempted-] the special designation of 'partial public employee.' " I d. 
135. Boris et al., supra note 134. 
136. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2648 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
137. Id. (citations omitted). 
138. See Boris et al., supra note 134. 
139. See SEIU Healthcare, Home Care, http://www.seiuhcilin.org/categorylhome-care 
[https://perm.a.cciH44R-Y26D]. 
140. Eileen Boris & Premilla Nadasen, Domestic Workers Organize!, 11 J. LAB. & Soc'Y 
413, 415 (2008), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.oomldoi/pdf/10.1111/j.1743-4580.2008.00217.x. 
141. ORGANIZING WOMEN WORKERS IN THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: BEYOND THE WEAPONS 
OF THE WEAK 7 (Naila Kabeer, Ratna Sudarshan & Kristy Milward eds., Zed Books Ltd. 
2013). 
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Poor workers and their allies have approached worker organizing 
through community and social justice movement models that implic-
itly reject the limited structures of traditional unionism that has, as 
Susan Porter Benson argues, "devoted most of its energy to enhanc-
ing the privileges of a constituency that was already in a position of 
privilege because of its race and gender."142 Vanessa Tait argues 
that these unions "usually begin their organizing in the community, 
taking on multiple issues outside the usual scope of representation, 
such as affordable housing, health care, childcare, racial and gender 
discrimination, and police brutality."143 According to Tait, "[these] 
unions offer a different vision of what the labor movement can be: 
activist based, inventive, adventurous, and infused with ideals of 
social justice and equality."144 
This struggle for worker rights including the right to collective 
bargaining has been centrally about the "rights of poor women as 
both clients of and workers for the welfare state."145 This fight led 
ultimately to health care workers incorporation into the SEIU after 
decades of struggle, seen as a hard-won revival of unionism due in 
part to SEilYs work to reach out to workers previously excluded 
from unions.146 For example, Bruce Nissen argues that SEilY s social 
movement orientation accounted for its success in organizing 
Florida nursing home workers. 147 
However, Eileen Boris and Jennifer Klein argue that the ruling 
in Harris shows that these two models of worker organizing may have 
reached an impasse.148 Boris and Klein raise this question at the end 
of Caring for America and in their update in Feminist Studies, written 
as a response to Harris: can the centralizing, top-down, growth-driven 
model of SEIU address the specific needs of care workers as well as 
the more activist and client centered approach that has defined 
Domestic Workers United? Home-care workers and domestic work-
ers have built their organizations through such client-worker care 
organizations as Caring Across Generations and in coalition with 
other community organizations.149 
142. VANESSA TAIT, POOR WORKERS' UNIONS: REBillLDING LABOR FROM BELOW 15 
(South End Press, 2005). 
143. Id. at 12. 
144. I d. at 2 . 
145. EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH WORKERS 
IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE, 151 (2012) [hereinafter BORIS & KLEIN, CARING 
FOR AMERICA]. 
146. See Bruce Nissen, A Different Kind of Union: SEIU Healthcare Florida from the 
Mid-1990s through 2009, in LIFE AND LABOR IN THE NEW NEW SOUTH 289, 301 (Robert 
H. Zieger ed., Univ. Press of Fl. 2012). 
147. Id. at 308. 
148. See Boris et al., supra note 134. 
149. BORIS & KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERlCA, supra note 145, at 151-52. 
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Further questions are raised for feminist organizers and work-
ers' rights advocates by the patriarchal framing of Harris. 150 What 
are the limits for incorporating home-care workers into public sector 
unions when the union includes those who are privileged by the 
white patriarchal framing of laws that ensure their status as "un-
paid" caregivers, while negating the absent structuring of the wel-
fare state in making that status possible?151 This is the subtext of 
Harris's complaint and Alita's opinion in Harris. 152 
While most histories of the case document it as part of a larger 
orchestrated attack on public sector unionism, it is also a strategic 
move to resist organizers' attempts to bring together care and labor, 
to bringing home and work together in a way that frames low-in-
come and no-income women's role as caregivers as central to the 
state. If we return to the archives that focus on the exploitive use of 
the "feeble-minded" as domestic workers, then we see the relation-
ship between eugenic sterilization and the logics of the majority in 
Harris: of utmost interest is the lesser cost to the state through 
exploitation of women's labor, even if it leaves those who do paid 
care work in poverty and without the ability to exercise the kind of 
ccideal motherhood" represented by Pamela Harris.163 
Alita argues that the compelling interest of the state is in 
providing home-care attendants ccto prevent the unnecessary institu-
tionalization of individuals who may instead be satisfactorily main-
tained at home at a lesser cost to the State."154 In this representation 
ofhome care, the rights of the disabled are not mentioned; instead the 
interests of the state are solely imagined in terms of cost benefit and 
Harris's willingness to align her interests as caregiver with the inter-
ests of the state.155 However, as Boris and Klein point out, most work-
fare placements for recipients of Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families udesignated home care, like home-based child care, an 
appropriate workfare placement only if performed for individuals 
other than family ."156 Thus, the split between care and work is implicit 
in the treatment of mothers based on their social class, because 
mothers of children with disabilities are considered deserving of a sub-
sidy to prevent the institutionalized care of their loved ones and 
mothers receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families are not. 
Nor are most working mothers able to provide even temporary 
care by taking leave time from work. For example, Alita's protection 
150. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014). 
151. See generally id. 
152. Seeid. 
153. See id. at 2623. 
154. See id. (emphasis added). 
155. See id. at 2645. 
156. BORIS & KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA, supra note 145, at 118. 
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of the relationship of mother and son in Harris is in stark contrast 
to my student who was threatened with the loss ofTANF benefits. 
This happened because daycare enrollment occurred in August while 
my student did not begin classes until after Labor Day. She was 
forced to "volunteer'' for a month at a local nonprofit. Workfare mea-
sures such as this have actually been the impetus, historically, for 
social justice movements.157 As Vanessa Tait and Premilla Nadasen 
have documented, the National Welfare Rights Organization had, in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s developed a coalition model of"wel-
fare recipients and the working poor, including low-wage workers, 
rank-and-file union caucus members, domestic workers, and the un-
employed."158 Since the earliest workfare schemes, workfare activists 
and low-wage union workers and public sector workers had worked 
together to avoid being pit against each other, "redefin[ing] welfare 
in terms of economic justice-the right to a decent job [of] livable 
wages-as well as the continued political fight for state support of 
caregiving activities in the home."159 
This simultaneous focus on economic justice and social citizen-
ship as caregivers recognizes the need to resist on two fronts the 
racist and classist frames that guide U.S. public policy and that 
protect and subsidize Pamela Harris's care for her son because it is 
in the "public interest," whereas excluding poor women's caregiving 
from collective bargaining-and, thus, denying that the state receives 
any benefit from their care labor.160 Shatema Threadcraft argues 
that these policies are a form of gendered racist oppression that 
extract Black women's care as a resource and exploit it for the labor 
ofwhite families: 
[t]ake the capability of Life. Life does not simply appear into the 
world. It must be reproduced and sustained. Whites have long 
been advantaged relative to blacks in their efforts to reproduce-
and therefore advantaged in coming into being. They have also 
been advantaged in their efforts to keep the body alive. And, if pro-
ducing and keeping the body itself alive forms a major part of 
"so-called" women's work'' [sic] the body politic has helped white 
women a great deal in their efforts while at the very least ne-
glecting black women in their efforts to do the same. Whites have 
157. TAIT, supra note 142, at 77. 
158. Out of this coalition came ACORN and the Movement for Economic Justice--at 
their roots, the movements developed by poor women of color to bring together the 
interests of those excluded from the labor and family laws that protect middle-class 
workers, offering some semblance of economic security and protection from exploitation. 
See id.; see generally PREM:ILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Routledge 2004). 
159. TAIT, supra note 142, at 179 (citation omitted). 
160. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2634-38 (2014). 
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hoarded support for bringing life into being and they have done 
so in a racialized social context where black women were far more 
likely to suffer disabling reproductive intervention. Whites have 
therefore hoarded opportunities to produce healthy infants. 161 
This hierarchy of "hoarding opportunities" is the case in the 
Family Medical Leave Act as well.162 Policies such as FMLA make 
clear that some members of the state are imagined as not being part 
of a care network that is integral to social citizenship-in which 
they will expect to care for others and be cared for themselves at 
some point in their lives-whereas others are imagined as full citi-
zens precisely through their ability to access FMLA as a benefit of 
economic and gendered privilege. 163 
Current economic and family policies perpetuate and exploit 
existing class and race inequalities among women to disenfranchise 
the majority of poor white and Black and Latina workers from access-
ing basic care for themselves, whereas at the same time symbolically 
excluding them from the personhood implied in the entitlement to 
care and economic security. The Supreme Court's decision reaffirms 
a system of racist and classist oppression for most women by treating 
these policies as gender neutral and by arguing that these are cases 
of"love and care" and not a means of emotional exploitation of women 
in service of the state and capital.164 At the same time, the laws pro-
duce as an effect the image of Pamela Harris to represent the public 
face of caregiving as one that insists on its private, apolitical nature. 
In all these cases, Pamela Harris, the student in my class, the 
imagined worker who takes leave, it is women who are the represen-
tative worker, but whose status is defined by the state in relational 
terms-according to the abilities of the child, according to her rela-
tion to the employer; Harris is rewarded for her marital status, her 
class status, and her symbolic representation of "ideal motherhood" 
but only so far as her interests align with the interests of the state 
and her work can be defined in relation to her son's disability-
perhaps if institutionalization were cheaper or more convenient for 
the state, then Harris, too, might find herself excluded from the 
public interest. 165 
According to a 2000 U.S. Department of Labor Study, more than 
sixty percent of low-wage mothers do not have access to paid leave 
161. THREADCRAFT, supra note 114, at 153. 
162. See id. at 157. 
163. See U.S. DEp'T OF LABOR, Need Time?: The Employee's Guide to the Family and 
Medical Leave Act 2 (2015), https:/lwww.dol.gov/whd/fmla/employeeguide.pdf. 
164. See Quinn, 134 S. Ct. at 2618. 
165. Seeid. 
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to take care of a sick child or other family member, but they also do 
not have access to other options for care.166 Whereas more than 77.8% 
of workers that make at least $75,000 a year are eligible for FMLA, 
less than 39.8% of workers that make less than $35,000 a year are 
eligible, and about 73.4% of workers who are in the $35,000 to 
$75,000 income bracket are also eligible, according to the U.S. Dept. 
of Labor. 167 According to the Feminist Majority Foundation: 
[t]he Department of Labor reports that only 11 percent of pri-
vate sector workers in the United States have access to paid 
family leave through their employers. Low-wage workers fare 
even worse. Only 5 percent of these workers receive paid leave. 
And research from the Center for American Progress indicates 
that Black and Latino workers are less likely to be able to access 
paid leave, even for the birth or adoption of a new child. 168 
Providing a gender-neutral unpaid family leave law, according to 
Deborah Anthony, 
overlooks the fact that changing the law merely masks those 
social stereotypes, assumptions, and expectations of women's 
caregiving roles and does not repair the problem. A law that 
refuses to take gender into account is effective only if the private 
social structure does not itself perpetuate women's inequality, 
regardless of what the law says.169 
It also does not address systemic racial inequalities that keep Black 
and Latina workers in the work force in informal or low-wage work 
and more often makes them both caregivers and breadwinners in 
the family. 170 
In this case, the state makes invisible the racist patriarchal 
assumptions of the structure oflabor and public policy, denying that 
the state benefits from the care work oflow-income women-indeed, 
166. Gaylynn Burroughs, Paid Family Medical Leave Shouldn't be a Luxury 
#FAMILYAct, MOMSRISING (Dec. 12, 2013), https:/lwww.momsrising.org/blog/paid-fam 
ily-medical-leave-shouldnt-be-a-luxury-familyact [https://perma.cc/9WRP-M3L2]. 
167. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA): Policy Issues, EvERYCRSREPORT.COM 
(Sept. 9, 2018, 1:21PM), https:/lwww.everycrsreport.com/reports/R43214.html# _Toc3660 
77861 [https://perma.cc/K33S-m.J6U]. 
168. Burroughs, supra note 166. 
169. Deborah Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: 
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(2008) (emphasis omitted). 
170. See Challenges with Taking FMLA Leave: Inequalities in A/fordability of FMLA 
Leave for Eligible Workers, by Race!Ethnicity, HELLER SCH. Soc. POL 'y & MGMT., http:// 
www. di versitydatakids.orglfiles/Policy/F::MLA/Capacity/Challenges%20with %20taking 
%20family%leave.pdf. 
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as we learned from the eugenic archives, the state has systemically 
exploited that work.171 Whereas joining the SEIU offers care workers 
a means of ensuring access to collective bargaining, it also assimilates 
workers to a leadership and organizing model that is traditionally 
based on white male leadership, electoral politics, and shop-cen-
tered.172 In contrast, Ai-Jen Poo describes how Domestic Workers 
United (one of the founding organizations of the National Domestic 
Workers Alliance) began in Asian-American community centers as 
part of a program that centered on racist and gendered violence. 173 
The organizers discovered that much of the violence domestic workers 
experienced was at the hand of their employers and that much of the 
oppression they suffered was structured into their lives as women 
of color, as immigrants, and as domestic workers.174 This organizing 
model-which has been more successful than traditional union 
organizers would have predicted-shares a similar consciousness-
raising model as reproductive justice organizing (protesting in the 
street, using worker and community centers based in race-ethnic 
affiliation as shop floors), argued for legislation (passing domestic 
workers' rights bills in several states), and used a pedagogical frame-
work (Caring Across the Generations and Hand in Hand) which 
educates the public, employers, patients, and their families about 
care work as labor.175 It recognizes that economic justice (redistribu-
tion) cannot occur without recognition. 176 
What Harris makes clear is that while the SEIU can provide 
worker security, its model of collective bargaining cannot provide 
caregivers with "recognition" or "redistribution" in the sense that 
the Supreme Court decision folds care work back into the frame-
work of the family, and refuses to recognize caregivers as being paid 
for work, preferring to see the payment as a form of keeping the 
ideal family "together."177 This ideal family can be seen as a strategy 
for structuring the care economy as private in two ways that are 
detrimental to women and care workers: (1) to privatize the system 
of care (or to keep it private in many cases) in the marketplace, 
refusing to recognize the state's obligations to the social welfare of 
citizens; and (2) to maintain care work in the private family, relying 
171. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2618 (2014). 
172. See generally id. 
173. Ai-Jen Poo & Eric Tang, Domestic Workers Organize in the Global City, in THE 
FIRE THIS TIME: ACTIVISM AND THE NEW FEMINISM 150, 163 (Vivien Labaton & Dawn 
Lundy Martin eds., 2004). 
17 4. See id. at 164. 
175. Id. 
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177. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2620, 2644 (2014). 
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on women's free emotional labor. This maintains the historical 
devaluation of feminized and racialized labor in an economy increas-
ingly devoted to the work of care, but protects and further aligns the 
interests of the "ideal family'' and the state. 178 
It may be an impossibility for domestic workers and home-care 
workers to translate their labor into "collective bodily presence" within 
the hierarchical bargaining model used by public sector unions.179 
It is only feminist social justice movement organizing that can pro-
vide a framework for the recognition that leads to economic justice 
in the care economy. 
Obama's executive order requiring overtime and minimum 
wage for home-care workers corrects the racist and sexist exclusion 
from the Fair Labor Standards Act. 180 But it corrects this wrong of 
the past without providing a floor for the future of low-income 
women workers and cannot mandate a shift in the care economy's 
exploitation of women. Such an order fails, like the Supreme Court 
and FMLA, to redress the unequal distribution of precarity as a 
chronic condition. Poor women, and more especially women of color, 
have to assert their labor as that which structures public policies of 
care in both the positive and negative sense. Public policy is still 
designed to create women of color as the structuring absence of 
gender- and race-neutral public policies designed to provide social 
and economic citizenship for some receivers and givers of care and 
to deny others redistribution, recognition, and representation. 181 
Journalist Liza Featherstone puts it this way: feminism needs 
to be concerned with those "whose bodies prevent them from creat-
ing profits for capital" because the contempt with which they are 
treated shows us that we are all disposable. 182 This requires strug-
gling against feminist historical collusion with capitalist eugenic 
framing of the body, including forced sterilization, and the use of 
state systems to exploit the care of women of color. 
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